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UTMOST GOOD FAITH – UNINTENDED
INJUSTICE?
For over two hundred years a policy of insurance has
been regarded as a contract of the utmost good faith. This
principle is about to be modified. The Consumer
Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Bill received
its second reading in the House of Lords on June 15, 2011
and will now be scrutinised by a Special Public Bill
Committee. Clause 2 of the Bill amends the duty of utmost
good faith in two respects as it applies pre-contractually to
consumers: it abolishes the duty of disclosure and alters the
remedies available to an insurer for misrepresentation.
Advocates of reform point to the harsh effects of the
existing law. Take, for instance, the duty of disclosure.
When purchasing a policy, a consumer must disclose all
material facts to the insurer, regardless of whether or not
the insurer asks relevant questions. A material fact is one
which would have an effect, not necessarily decisive, on the
mind of a prudent underwriter in assessing the risk. If an
insurer is induced to enter into a contract by a non-
disclosure it may on becoming aware of the true facts avoid
the policy ab initio and reject any claims (Pan Atlantic v Pine
Top [1995] 1 AC 501). This is so whether the consumer
acted fraudulently, negligently or entirely innocently.
In Lambert v Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd [1975] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 485, Mrs Lambert insured her jewellery under
an all-risks policy for more than nine years. When the
jewellery was lost, her claim was rejected on the grounds
that she had not disclosed that her husband had been
convicted of two offences of dishonesty. The omission was
hardly surprising as the insurer had never asked Mrs
Lambert about such matters. As MacKenna J said: “Mrs
Lambert is unlikely to have thought that it was necessary to
disclose the distressing fact of her husband’s conviction
when she was renewing the policy on her little store of
jewellery. She is not an underwriter and has presumably no
experience in these matters”. Despite expressing sympathy
with Mrs Lambert, the Court of Appeal was faced with
clear law and felt obliged to find for the insurer.
What are the origins of this onerous rule of law?
Insurance law students at St Mary’s University College,
Twickenham are advised to visit the parish church, where a
black marble slab covers a family burial vault. Although the
slab is badly damaged a familiar name is visible: “Under
this marble in a vault lies buried the body of Charles
Boehm, esq. who died January 26, 1769, aged 69 years”.
Charles Boehm was, of course, the defendant insurer in
Carter v Boehm (1766) 1 Blackstone W 593, the landmark
case in which Lord Mansfield delivered the first clearly-
reported decision on the duty of disclosure. In 1759,
during the Seven Years War, Roger Carter was employed by
the East India Company as Deputy-Governor of Fort
Marlborough, a lightly fortified trading post on the island
of Sumatra. Those holding such appointments were
expected to augment their remuneration by conducting
business on their own account. Fearing attacks from the
French and the native population, and wishing to protect
his trading stock, Roger Carter sent a letter to England
asking his brother, George Carter, to arrange insurance on
his behalf. On March 29, 1760, the Comte d’Estaing, aided
by Dutch pilots, sailed a warship and a frigate into the bay
outside Fort Marlborough. Roger Carter and others fled
into the interior of the island, but were later captured by
the French and their possessions seized.
Oblivious to these developments, George Carter
received his brother’s letter and instructed a broker named
Cawthorne to arrange insurance. The policy, retrospective
to December 1, 1759, was underwritten by Charles
Boehm, a well-known merchant in the City of London.
However, when Roger Carter made a claim for £10,000 in
respect of his lost trading stock, it was rejected by Boehm
on the grounds that Carter had failed to disclose his fears
of attack and the weaknesses of Fort Marlborough. In a
classic judgment, Lord Mansfield said: “Insurance is a
contract on speculation: the special facts usually lie in the
knowledge of the insured only. The underwriter trusts to
him, that he conceals nothing, so as to make him form a
wrong estimate. If a concealment happens without any
fraudulent intention by mistake of the principal or his
agent, still the policy is void…”. The law was subsequently
codified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the relevant
provisions of which have been held to be equally applicable
to non-marine insurance.
Is it wise to interfere with such a well-established if
potentially harsh rule of law? Perhaps a better question is
whether the rule should ever have been applied to
consumer insurances. In 1759 personal insurances were
the preserve of the wealthy. The wide range of policies and
sales channels available to all today did not exist. Would
Lord Mansfield have regarded it as appropriate to impose a
duty of disclosure on consumers of modern mass-market
insurance policies? Five factors might have given him pause
for thought:
Relative expertise
In Carter v Boehm, Lord Mansfield was settling the rules
to be applied to business insurances, where parties have
similar bargaining power and experience. In Georgian
times the sharing of risk was commonplace in the City of
London; a merchant might be an insurer for some
transactions and an insured for others. Consequently it was
not unreasonable to expect prospective insureds to
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understand what needed to be disclosed. Then as now
commercial insureds looked for certainty and a pragmatic
approach. Contrast this with the position of a modern
consumer who will typically have no knowledge of
insurance law and may expect and deserve an approach
grounded in fairness.
Absence of advice
Roger Carter’s policy was written as a custom contract
agreed in a face-to-face transaction with the prospective
insured advised by a broker. That is very different from
consumer policies today where there is little opportunity to
individually negotiate terms and sales are increasingly made
over the internet or telephone without the involvement of
a broker.
Ease of communications
In 1759, it might have taken a year or more for an
enquiry to be sent by packet ship to Sumatra and for a
reply to be received. There was no opportunity for a
discourse with Roger Carter – writing insurance at such a
distance would have been totally impracticable unless the
prospective insured could be relied upon to disclose all
relevant information. Nowadays questions can rapidly be
posed and answered over the web, by telephone, email or
fax or even by post.
Inequality of knowledge
Lord Mansfield suggested that “the special facts usually
lie in the knowledge of the insured only” but nowadays
insurers have access to a wide range of databases, research
results and loss statistics. For example, 95 per cent of the
household insurance market is covered by CUE, a system
which records previous incidents and claims and will often
prove more accurate than a consumer’s memory. Motor
insurers have founded their own research establishment at
Thatcham. Life insurers employ actuaries to provide
statistics on all aspects of mortality and morbidity – in
1759 the establishment of the first life insurer to
underwrite business on scientific principles was still three
years away. Of course some facts remain in the knowledge
of the prospective insured alone, but if important these can
and should be the subject of clear questions.
Failure of reciprocity
Lord Mansfield considered that the duty of disclosure
was reciprocal. However, over subsequent years the
obligations on a prospective insured appear to have
become more onerous, whilst the duty of disclosure on
insurers has proven to be limited to matters affecting the
nature of the risk or the recoverability of a claim.
Furthermore the sole remedy available for non-disclosure
– avoidance of the contract – is valuable to insurers as it
removes the liability to pay claims, but unattractive to
consumers who would prefer damages to a mere return of
premiums. Steyn J, as he then was, made a bold attempt to
establish true reciprocity in a commercial case, Banque
Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandia (UK) [1987] 2 WLR 1300, but
was overturned on appeal.
It should also be noted that despite statements to the
contrary in Wikipedia and, more surprisingly, at least one
leading textbook, Lord Mansfield found in favour of Roger
Carter. In doing so he recognised the severe impact of
avoidance and warned that inappropriate reliance by an
insurer on the duty of disclosure could itself amount to
fraud.
Taking these factors together, one may reasonably doubt
whether the duty of disclosure should have been applied to
consumer insurances. Certainly industry and regulatory
initiatives have long recognised that the duty should be
modified or abandoned. In 1981, Mike Harris of Guardian
Royal Exchange announced that the duty would no longer
be relied upon by his company for general insurance. His
explanation still rings true: “You cannot import into the
way we handle bulk insurance products now the close
contractual relationship derived from the time a ship or
cargo owner dealt directly with an underwriter in a coffee
house 300 years ago…”. More recently, in 2005, the
Financial Ombudsman Service issued guidance indicating
it will not support insurers where they rely on the duty of
disclosure. Rules issued by the Financial Services Authority
recognise the duty but in the absence of fraud bar an
insurer from rejecting a claim for non-disclosure where the
consumer could not reasonably be expected to have
disclosed the fact in question. After damaging publicity
relating to rejected critical illness claims, insurers issued a
code entitled Non-Disclosure and Treating Customers Fairly
which seeks to mitigate the worst aspects of the law, though
only in respect of life, critical illness and income protection
insurance. However, these and other measures do not offer
a complete answer to the ills of the law and the
inconsistencies of approach and scope may cause
confusion.
The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations)
Bill is the natural next step. For the duty of disclosure on
consumers it provides a single, clear and fair solution: abo-
lition. Consumer groups, charities and leading industry
associations have expressed their support. Hopefully the Bill
will be enacted without delay.
Peter Tyldesley
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The author will be publishing an extended paper on Carter v Boehm later
this year (tyldesleyp@smuc.ac.uk).
2
Amicus Curiae Issue 86 Summer 2011
